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BOOK REVIEWS
ADmINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES.

By John Dickinson. Volume II of Harvard Studies in Administrative Law.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1927.

Pp. xiii, 403.

The development in recent years of remedial processes other than those
available in the courts has produced a progeny of legal questions which, in turn,
have engendered various and sundry articles and monographs. But little has
been accomplished in the nature of a comprehensive survey of the problems
which have arisen and find their roots in common ground. A discussion such
as the book here reviewed, which, while disclaiming the character of a comprehensive treatise, undertakes to study in related fashion the various fields
of administrative authority, is a welcome addition to the literature on this
branch of the law.
Judicial review of administrative determinations is the subject-matter of
the discussion; and the twelve chapters of the book, with the exception of the
last, find an admirable cohesion in their common relation to this single topic.
The last chapter, though plausibly excused, undertakes to include a discussion
of certain phases of legal education which are, it seems to the reviewer, rather
remotely related to the main theme.
The essential problem involved in the matter of judicial review is traced,
as is indicated in the author's choice of title for the book, to the time-honored
contrast between a government of laws and a government of men; and the
appraisal of administrative activity, as well as the determination of the appropriate measure of court review, is facilitated by reference to this underlying contrast. It is recognized that the administrative function has developed, not so
much because of essential congeniality with Anglo-Saxon ideas of law and legal
procedure; but because of difficulties encountered in dealing with concrete
problems, either on account of the cumbersome character of ordinary judicial
machinery, on account of the technical nature of the subject-matter of the
controversy, or in view of the fact that government is determining the basis for
its own action, as in land-grant and patent cases. Since, however, the growing
complexity of affairs has necessitated new methods of accomplishing justice
and fair play, Anglo-Saxon theories naturally assign to 'the courts the duty
of seeing that the tribunal created, or the officer appointed, shall keep within the
scope of the authority delegated.
With admirable insight the author then points out the source of the principal difficulties: where rests the authority to define? how is the line to be
drawn which separates a question of fact from a question of law? To illustrate: is the conception of "unfair competition" one to be defined by the courts,
or is it a conclusion of fact from all the evidence? Is the ascertainment of undue prejudice a finding of fact? Does a rule of law decide what facts may
and what may not be relevant to a determination of the reasonableness of a
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rate? To illustrate further: if the Interstate Commerce Commission finds that
a railroad is guilty of undue prejudice, not because it treats two patrons differently, but because it treats one of its shippers differently from the way another railroad treats a competing shipper, is not a question of law involveda question that requires judicial decision as to whether an essential element of
the wrong known as discrimination or undue prejudice is not the treatment of
two patrons differently by the same public utility1
Obviously, as the author points out-and this constitutes one of the reasons
for his justification of court review-such questions should be subject to judicial consideration and determination if the law is to continue to grow as it has
grown in the past; so that the question narrows, as he indicates, to the problems
of what, in particular cases will constitute questions of fact, or what are essential features of certain concepts or definitions.!
Naturally, there is room for difference of opinion here, and the author's
conception of the proper scope of judicial review is a fairly narrow one, especially in those cases where the administrative tribunal has come into being, as
has the Interstate Commerce Commission, so that there may be a tribunal
"appointed by law and informed by experience"' for the purpose of passing on
questions requiring a substantial amount of technical knowledge and a high
degree of technical skill. So he criticises the Ben Avon case," because it held
that the utility was entitled to the "independent judgment of the court" as to
its value. But, while the author does not overlook the fact that this case involved judiclfl review of administrative action, not in its ordinary sense, but for
the purpose of determining whether due process had been accorded, he seems to
give less weight than is required by the decisions to the necessity for a real
review in cases involving constitutional validity.
'See Central R. R. Co. of N. J. v. United States, 257 U. S. 247 (I921).
The author (pages 174, 207) regards the doctrine of this case as repudiated by
United States v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 263 U. S. 515 (1924) ; but in this
latter case the Supreme Court did not overrule the Jersey Central case, but,
on the contrary, pointed-out that its later conclusion was not inconsistent with
that case (page 52o). And the Interstate Commerce Commission continues
to apply the rule of the Jersey Central case. See, for example, MinnesotaDakota Transit Millers v. A. A. R. R. Co., 118 I. C. C. 585, 591 (1926); Virginia Coal Operators' Ass'n. v. A. & R. L R. Co., 120 I. C. C. 283, 293
(1926).
'An interesting illustration is found in the recent opinion of the Supreme
Court of the United States in B. & 0. R. R. Co. v. Goodman, decided October
31, 1927, where the Court held, as a matter of law, that certain conduct constituted negligence, and, speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, said:
"It is true as said in Flannelly v. Delaware & Hudson C-, 225 U. S.
597, 603, that the question of due care very generally is left to the jury.
But we are dealing with a standard of conduct, and when the standard is
clear it should be laid down once for all by the courts. See Southern
Pacific Co. v. Berkshire, 254 U. S. 415, 417, 419."
" Illinois Central R. R. Co. v., I. C. C., 2o6 U. S. 441, 454 (19o7).
'Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287 (1920).

See
Buchanan, The Ohio Valley Water Company Case and the Valuation of Railroads, (1927) 4o H v. L. REv. 1033.
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In similar fashion the author, while disclaiming an intent to "enter upon a
critique of valuation theory" (page 226) cannot refrain from a rather partisan
treatment of the prudent investment theory; and he dismisses somewhat
cavalierly the decisions that have declined to accept this basis for valuation,
as well as the cases that have confirmed the principle of the Ben Avon case.
But it seems difficult for any one to enter this highly controversial field with
cold neutrality; and, while to the reviewer, portions of the book seem partisan,
this may be due to his own bias rather than to that of the author.
In any event, the book is a most helpful contribution to the subject of which
it treats. By undertaking a discussion of underlying principles rather than a
meticulous review of the cases (though the cases are not neglected) it makes
a real step forward in the development of this important topic of the law.
The author's lucid and logical style add much, both to the value of his
book, and to the pleasure of the reader.
Henry Wolf Bikli.
University of Pennsylvania Law School.
AMERICAN COURTS-THEm ORGANIZATION

AND PROCEDURF.

By Clarence N.

Callender. McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, 1927. Pp. viii, 284
The preface to Professor Callender's book states its purpose and its limitations. It is a book intended for the general public and the student, rather than
the lawyer. Even the lawyer, however, will not object to this simple treatment of an involved and intricate subject, and the layman will, for the first
time, I presume to say, find our judicial system in its main outline and methods
comprehensible.
Professor Callender has accomplished his purpose by a convincing familiarity with the whole range of his subject and by a simple, direct style. It
is a feat to have condensed so broad a field into fewer than three hundred pages
and at the same time to have made the book more than a mere outline.
But what sets it apart from most legal treatises written for layman or lawyer is its quiet humor and its daring. Professor Callender takes his readers into
his confidence, interests them with apt and often amusing illustrations and, above
all, makes them think. Although he is not afraid to point out the shortcomings
or the defects of our judicial system, he is even more ready to display its virtues. His chapter entitled "The Problem of Improving Legal Procedure" is a
challenge to the profession, and a just one. I wish that every lawyer and every
judge might read it. But it is of value to those outside of the profession as
well. It impresses upon them the fact that injustice is exceptional rather than
usual, and that judges, in spite of their human limitations, are a remarkably
able and fair-minded group of men. The high integrity of the book, coupled
with its intelligently tolerant attitude, gives it a significance beyond its mere
informative value.
To say that the book reads like a novel, that it belongs on the shelf with
Mr. Wellman's Gentlemen of the Jury is quite true, but it is more than that
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It is a legal treatise, valuable as such. Only the supersensitive and finicky will
find fault with Professor Callender because, owing to the lack of space, he has
had to present the general rather than the particular, and to omit the hairsplitting exceptions so precious to the legal mind. "American Courts" is in
general accurate; it is logical, clear and interesting in presentation; and its conclusions are both true and noteworthy.
Wendell Phillips Raine.
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
F~nnarA TAx APPEAI.s. By Kingman Brewster and James S. Y. Ivins. John
Byrne & Co., Washington, D. C., 1927. Pp. xxii, 944.
This book is a revision and elaboration of a previous volume published by
the same authors on "Procedure and Practice Before the Board of Tax Appeals." Their present edition covers the entire field of procedure in relation to
tax appeals embracing discussion on practice and procedure:
i. In the Bureau of Internal Revenue
2. Before the Board of Tax Appeals
3. In the several Federal Courts.

Part I of the edition under review-Procedure Preliminary to Appeal-is well worth careful study by any attorney or tax practitioner, particularly
Chapter II, Selection of Remedies. A taxpayer, confronted with an unsatisfactory final determination by the Commissioner with respect to income or
profits taxes, gift taxes or estate taxes, has a choice of remedies, which should
be exercised with reference to the particular circumstances of his case. Generally speaking, the choice is between instituting a proceeding before the Board
of Tax Appeals, and bringing an action at law in a United States District
Court or the Court of Claims. Since the enactment of the Revenue Act of
z926, a taxpayer, except in certain instances, no longer has the right to proceed
first before the Board and later, after an adverse decision, to bring a suit in
court, as was possible under the Revenue Act of z924. The various considerations which should influence the decision of the taxpayer to avail of one remedy
rather than another are fully and clearly set forth in this book, and to the
best of my knowledge, this is the only work published dealing with this phase of
the Tax Laws.
Part II of this volume is devoted to "Procedure in Board of Tax Appeals."
The Board was created by the Revenue Act of 1924 as an independent tribunal
to which a taxpayer might resort for a determination of his tax liability before
payment. Although declared by the Statute to be an agency of the executive
branch of the Government, the Board has functioned under a procedure that has
been judicial in form and effect, and in every practical sense is a court in
which the taxpayer and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue are parties litigant. A thorough knowledge of the nature and limits of jurisdiction of the
Board is of paramount importance to any attorney engaged to any extent in tax
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practice. The authors have devoted one entire and lengthy chapter to an exhaustive treatise on this subject. Considerable attention has also been given
to the legislative history of the Board, which is not only an interesting study
but should be of considerable value in clearing up doubts and ambiguities suggested by the language of the Act.
The Act of z926 provides that the proceedings of the Board should be
conducted in accordance with such rules of practice and procedure as the
Board might prescribe. The rules which have been promulgated by the Board,
both as to procedure before trial and procedure at trial, are fully and systematically set forth in Chapters V and VI. These chapters in themselves are of sufficient merit to recommend the book to any attorney who has not had considerable
experience in practice before the Board. The Act of 1926 provides that the
rules of evidence to be followed by the Board are those recognized in the Courts
of Equity in the District of Columbia, and the authors have wisely included a
complete compendium of these rules, thereby giving their readers a handy reference text on this subject.
'Cases heard and decisions rendered after February 26, 1926, by the Board
of Tax Appeals are reviewable by the Circuit Courts of Appeals, and the procedure in connection with such review, as well as the procedure for review by
certiorari, is also discussed at considerable length. This is a new feature which
has not been dealt with in the various tax publications which have come to my
notice.
The appendix is voluminous. It contains the full text of all the rules of practice of the Board of Tax Appeals, as well as of the federal courts, including
the new rules of the United States Court of Claims effective since February i,
1927.
The appendix also includes a complete list of forms, official and from
precedents, for use in practice before the Internal Revenue Bureau, Board of
Tax Appeals, and for tax claims and appeals in all of the federal courts, all of
which adds greatly to the practical value of the book.
The entire volume is logically arranged, well indexed, and contains fairly
copious footnotes with references to the statutes and to carefully selected cases.
It is a painstaking and exhaustive effort to cover the entire subject of Federal
Tax Appeals.
The Revenue Acts of 1924 and z926 entirely changed the procedure in
federal tax cases and every attorney engaged in tax litigation has felt the urgent
need for a book of this character. Although the various "Tax Services" report
all rules of procedure as they are promulgated by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue or by the Board of Tax Appeals, these "Services" do not satisfy this
need. It is inconceivable that any practicing attorney is not at some time confronted with federal tax problems, and this volume should be indispensable
to all attorneys having but occasional tax appeal cases as well as being of considerable value to those attorneys making a specialty of this comparatively new
field.
Jacob W. Rhine.
Philadelphia.
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BY Philip C.
Jessup, with foreword by Charles Cheney Hyde. G. A. Jennings Co., New
York, x927. Pp. xxxviii, 548, Addenda 2 pages.

Tm LAW oF TER~oztL WATERS AND MARImME JUUsDIcTIoN.

The phrase "Maritime Jurisdiction," included by Mr. Jessup in his title,
is used to express at least two different things. In the United States it often
designates the jurisdiction under the Constitution (Art. III, secs. 1, 2) of district courts sitting in admiralty. With this subject Mr. Jessup has nothing to
do, though he of course is familiar with the usage, as witnesses his acute discussion of The Queen v. Keyn (pp. 124 ff., p. 130, p. 17). The phrase is
also often used more broadly, designating the power which a state does, or consistent with principles of international law should, exercise through its courts
with reference to occurrences on navigable waters, whether territorial waters
or the high seas. With this subject Mr. Jessup wholly concerns himself but
mainly only so far as territorial waters are involved. The last part of his title,
therefore, suggests that his book covers more ground than it actually does cover
and in this respect is a little misleading-at all events it did in fact mislead the
reviewer. Again, Mr. Jessup defines the term jurisdiction as referring to the
power of the courts to adjudicate, and a discussion of "maritime jurisdiction"
ought therefore to include not only what the courts of a state can or ought to do,
but perhaps also a liscussion of which courts can.or ought to do it. He is only
incidentally concerned with this last consideration. His title suggests a little
more than his book fulfills. On the other hand he goes beyond his title as
limited by this phrase, for Mr. Jessup, to our great advantage, discusses not
only jurisdiction in the above sense but control, i. e., "the power of administrative or executive officers to govern the actions of individuals or things." In
other words he does not at all make the mistake that case system lawyers sometimes make of regarding international law inaction as depending finally on decided cases. With regard to territorial waters "control" is of the greatest importance.
So far as the foregoing paragraph criticizes Mr. Jessup's book adversely, it
is only a criticism of his title and is somewhat ungracious, but it will serve to
indicate the scope of his actual subject. The book is most interesting, timely and
valuable. The reviewer is not competent to judge how complete Mr. Jessup's
presentation of authorities is, but it is to be observed in passing that though he
has made use of the Revue Internationale de Droit Maritime, he has not made
use of its successor, the Revue de Droit Maritime Compar6, which contains
some matter germane to his subject. The reviewer can say, however, that Mr.
Jessup introduces his readers to a great body of material, judicial, executive,
diplomatic and academic. Anyone who has searched in the interstices and footnotes of general textbooks on international law, in decided cases, and in other
places for the law of territorial waters to ascertain their extent and to solve
problems of jurisdiction and control, knows how very difficult it is to encompass his subject, so to speak. Mr. Jessup's book should enable him to do so. It
also does much more. The author analyzes his material acutely and at the
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same time, without at all departing from realities, integrates his conclusions
throughout, and finally makes his own suggestions in the form of a draft convention, practicable because it makes use of proposals previously made and
much discussed. The intelligent practitioner on whichever side of the fence he
may be, welcomes a textbook in which the author has ideas that are reasonable and convincing, and finds his own ideas taking a much more arguable form
than when he is confronted by a book which merely treats material with no
critical observations except that implicit in the phrase: "On the other hand other
authorities have held . . ." The practitioner will find Mr. Jessup's work of
the former sort. Mr. Jessup is also too much of a realist, too scrupulous and too
scholarly ever to mislead the student into believing that what Mr. Jessup and
others have thought ought to be, necessarily is. The general reader will also
find fascination and charm not only in the material which Mr. Jessup presents
but also in the way he handles it and in what he himself suggests.
Austin Tappan Wright.
University of Pennsylvania Law School.

LAw, LiF., AND LETmas. By Lord Birkenhead. George H. Doran Co., New
York, 1927. 2 vols., pp. 296, 326.
American lawyers may have heard Lord Birkenhead deliver an address in
1923 at the Minneapolis meeting of the American Bar Association on the development of the British constitution or they may have read his books on International Law and English Judges or his biography by Ephesian; all those having an opportunity to become acquainted with the career of this remarkable
Englishman from obscurity to the leading position as barrister at the English
bar, solicitor general, attorney general, member of the House of Commons,
Lord Chancellor and the peerage will welcome from his ben these two volumes of
delightful essays.
As the title would indicate, Lord Birkenhead has dipped into various
phases of life and thought, some of which have little interest for Americans
who, for instance, care nothing for the truth concerning "Margot Asquith."
However, his essay on eloquence is particularly good and is an admirable
complement to Senator Beveridge's essay on the art of public speaking. Any
lawyer could read with renewed determination the essay on the "Milestones of
my Life," which Lord Birkenhead names as his winning of a fellowship at
Wadham College, Oxford, enabling him to gratify his desire for a college education, his maiden speech at the Oxford Union Society, his meeting with
Joseph Chamberlain who took an interest in him and made the way a bit easier
in the House of Commons, and his elevation to the woolsack. The virility
and determination of the man should be a source of inspiration to us.
All lovers of Sir Walter Scott will appreciate Lord Birkenhead's address
before the Scott Society in Edinburgh. Especially good are the lines:
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"I cannot doubt that Walter Scott was of the spirit and company of
those gay and vivid troubadours who journeyed through the ballad-loving
cities of Greece, singing their sweet songs beneath its violet skies. William
Deloraine, Roderick Dhu, the Last Minstrel, the Duchess of Buccleuchname after name springs to mind when one thinks of the remarkable technique, marred here and there perhaps by an element of crudity, but redeemed
by an artistry which is only realized after repeated and painstaking analysis."
There are pungent words in his essay on the Gladstone case and cognate topics concerning the modem attempt to drag historic personages from their pedestals
and so sensitive was H. G. Wells to the criticism that he devoted considerable
space in his article in the Sunday supplement of the New York Times for
December 11, 1927, in answer to the strictures. Lord Birkenhead says of
Wells:
"But I must confess that where I admire him most is for the extraordinary skill with which he has succeeded in foisting off tiresome pamphlets
upon the reviewers and the public in the guise of romances. That he should
have done so with success is indeed extraordinary tribute to the kind of
chloroforming position to which he has attained;"
The essay on the law and the public is of particular interest to us at the
present time when there is widespread complaint as to the inability of our
judicial process to properly function. Happily there seems to be no situation
in England requiring both the prosecution and defense to shadow juries nor
any disposition of English lawyers to rush into print condemning the judicial
process in particular pending cases. The essay on the King's proctor, whose
duty it is to see that the court is not misled in divorce proceedings will suggest to many the desirability of a similar officer in some of our jurisdictions.
In a word, these volumes are easy to read and will afford delightful mental excursions to both the lawyer and layman. Incidentally they show the educational equipment of a brilliant English lawyer, judge, and politician.
0. R. McGuire.
Washington, D. C.
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